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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to offer an approach to the world of the Palestinian elites in 
Jerusalem. In order to achieve this, I am focused on the Nashashibis and Husaynis, and on the 
relationship between these and the foreign powers that have governed their land. 
As a preliminary step, I offer an analysis on the elites theory, first of all by referring to its 
main scholars, Mosca and Pareto, and eventually by introducing the analysis made by several 
scholars such as Bottomore, Schumpeter and Mills, just to mention a few specialist in the field. 
In every society, throughout the history of humankind, there has been one class governing 
the remaining segments of society: a group of families or a clan would make decisions on 
behalf of the rest of the society to which they belong. 
The Palestinian case has been no exception. The traditional families have ruled the people 
and each and every village throughout Palestine. Taking in consideration this background, in 
his book Arbiei Eretz Israel, Yacov Shimoni makes a distinction between three different groups 
of families: The urban families --governing at the national level--, the rural-urban families --
endowed with regional power--, and the rural families --rulers of their villages. 
This paper focuses on the first group and, above all, on the fate of the Nashashibis and 
Husaynis. Their lust for power and their mutual rivalry have made them take different paths 
after the 181 resolution of the United Nations. It is true that, a few years before 1947, their 
rivalry is made open and becomes materialized in the creation of their own political parties. 
Still, the events taking place after 1948 might have changed the history of the region. What 
influence might have had the international legitimation of a Palestinian government in Gaza? 
What role might have been allotted to these two families in the coalescence of the two 
factions? What kind of relationship might have evolved between each of these families and the 
Hashemite monarchy? This questions and several others are analyzed in depth and in relation 
to the social and political events that took place in the modern Middle East resulting from the 
creation of the State of Israel. 
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How have these elites striven to preserve their power and identitiy throughout those 
turbulent years? Do they really preserve it or de they have to metamorphose themselves into 
political parties or other forms of assossiations? Or is it that they have only tried to preserve 
their political and religious power above all?... 
Ariel Blufstein 
Buenos Aires, octubre de 2000 
  
Theoretical framework 
When seeking to understand a social theory of the elites, it becomes necessary to 
corroborate the following points: 
a) Behind the legitimate owners of the state power, there are or coexist a number of stable 
groups which are in possession of power that sets them apart from the other groups. 
b) These groups have decisive political influence 
c) They serve as a recruiting ground for members of the government. 
These points are evaluated below in order to distinguish and analyze the Palestinian elite 
in Jerusalem. First of all, the basic concepts of any elite must be defined. 
 
The elite, concept and ideology 
Life in the modern and industrial era call for a political system --regardless of its essence 
and the society in which it is applied-- in which important political decisions are taken by a 
few individuals. 
Any theory on the elites relies on two main assumptions: First of all, the masses are 
intrinsically incompetent, and therefore these should not be given the possibility to decide. 
Secondly, they are inert matter, modelled at will, as well as ungovernable and unsatiable 
beings with a proclivity to undermine culture and liberty, indispensable pillars of the modern 
democracies. 
Even though the main goals of the elites consist in preserving and promoting the interests 
of the community, these impose on the State a specific role and assign to it tasks that have 
been defined in accordance to their basic interests. 
According to Aristo, man is a political animal. Still, it is often stated that, as a man's strength 
and energies are absorbed fundamentally by his personal life, for the common man politics 
becomes a marginal issue, a state at which a few chosen arrive. In consequence, several 
experts on the subject state that the elite consists of a few men, governing first of all to secure 
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their own selfish interests and then to secure the welfare of the people, but always according 
to their own values. 
It could be stated that there is a certain amount of truth in this claim. In the history of 
humankind, all the main political, economic and social decisions have been made, not only by 
the politicians, but also by a small number of powerful individuals. 
Bottomore makes a distinction between the political class and the politcal elite. The former 
is composed by those groups which exercise political power or influence, and are directly 
engaged in struggles for political leadership. The latter is integrated by a smaller group of 
individuals who actually exercise political power in a society in any given time. There are two 
principal elites in the economic, political and military sphere, and these are in fact a cohesive 
group: 
a) The governing elite: Those who occupy the position of command in a society. 
b) The ruling class (the concept will be further developed in the following section): The 
class which owns the major instrument of economic production in a society and which is 
shown to be a cohesive group because its members have definite economic interests in 
common. 
Since the power of a ruling class arises from its ownership of prosperity, and since this 
prosperity can easily be transmitted from generation to generation, the class has an enduring 
character. It is integrated by a group of families which remain as it component elements over 
long periods of time through the transmision of family property. Its composition is not 
entirely immutable, for new families may enter it and old families may decline, but the greater 
parts of its members continue from generation to generation. 
 
The antecedent, Mosca and Pareto 
Both investigators have been the first scholars to give a thrust to the research into the 
elites in their first edition of Elementi di Scienza Politica (1896). Mosca states that in any given 
society there are two kinds of individuals, divided into two clearly distinct groups: The 
governing and the governed class. There is nothing remarkable in the above-mentioned 
statement; yet, Mosca endows this statement with an antidemocratic nuance by insisting that 
one class is dominated by the other. In other words, the first class, smaller in size that the 
second one, takes care of all the political functions, monopolizes the power and knows how to 
enjoys its benefits. Mosca defines and calls this class the “Ruling Class”. The second class is 
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controlled by means that could range between legality and arbitrariness, depending on the 
circumstances. 
Mosca calls the ruling group a “Ruling Class,” and he recognizes as Pareto that it is itself 
composed of distinct social groups. Pareto observes that the upper stratum of society 
nominally contains certain groups of people that are called aristocracies. 
Moreover Mosca adds that, in modern times, not only is the elite prominent at the top of 
the social pyramid and is it totally unsconnected from the rest of the pyramid, but it is also 
intimately linked to it by means of a sub-elite. This group is even greater than the first one and 
consists of the so-called middle class of civil servants, white collar workers, scientists, 
scholars and intellectuals. This group is a vital element of the governing class. 
How does an elite hold power? In order to answer this question, Mosca introduces in his 
theory the notion of social force as the main element and source in the creation of an elite. In 
order to survive, it is crucial for the governing elites to reflect the changing forces of society 
and also to monopolize the talent of its members. 
Mosca states “that the whole history of civilized mankind comes down to a conflict between 
the tendency of dominant elements to monopolize political power and transmit possession of 
it by inheritance, and the tendency towards a dislocation of old forces and an insurgence of 
new forces; this conflict produces an unending ferment of endosmosis and exosmosis 
between the upper classes and certain portions of the lower. Ruling classes decline inevitably 
when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to power, when they 
can no longer render the social services which they once rendered, or when their talents and 
the service they render lose in importance in the social environment in which they live...” 
(Mosca, Gaetano, The Ruling Class, p. 65-66). According to the text, the precursors confirm the 
existance of circulation between the elites and the other classes; moreover, they consider it as 
the feedback factor of the elite itself. The social balance relies on a sufficient quantity of 
talented and ambicious individuals who become members of the elites. In addition, a 
governing class may also be fed by the arrival of whole groups and families belonging to the 
inferior classes. In other words, if the governing elite is reluctant to incoporate new members 
from the inferior classes to its ranks, a revolution may be forthcoming. 
 
The Elites in the Third-World Countries 
This paper is focused on an area belonging to the so-called “third world” or “developing 
countries”. Before 1948, the region is governed by Great Britain, on account of the territorial 
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divisions take place in the aftermath of the First World War. ...”Article 22 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations instituted the system of the mandate. It speaks of “people yet not able to 
stand by themselves... [and therefore] tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to 
advanced nations... as mandatories on behalf of the League”... as Dr. Sela explains in his 
Political Dictionary of the Middle East. 
Palestine is governed as a Class A mandate, according to the above-mentioned article. In 
practice, however, it is managed as an English colony. Under this regime, Great Britain is 
expected to provide administrative assistance both in Palestine and in the region so that this 
may overcome its lack of stability. The relationship between the Mandate and the Palestinian 
elite becomes a key factor affecting the fate of both the Palestinian aristocracy and the 
emerging Arab nationalism. Bottomore distinguishes four categories of developing or third-
world countries, each of them with their important similarities of social structure and culture: 
a) The African States 
b) The Arab States of the Middle East and North Africa 
c) The Asian States 
d) The Latin American States 
Among the countries belonging to group b, a number of them have been formed by 
independence struggles against direct colonial rules, but many others have enjoyed political 
independence for some time and have chiefly had to resist the indirect control of their 
economic resources by foreign powers. Their political problems are mainly those of breaking 
down feudal systems of government which are linked with highly inegalitarian and rigid class 
systems. 
Industrialization in the developing countries, in contrast to the Western countries, takes 
place in a recurrent state of political instability: The popular masses demand better standards 
of living, and the traditional elements of society object to these changes. 
These traditional elements sometimes keep the masses inactive. This attitude consequently 
fosters the birth of a new elite in charge of mobilizing the masses and of bringing about the 
economic development. 
It is possible to define five ideal kinds of leadership in the process of industrialization: (1) a 
dynastic elite, (2) the middle class, (3) the revolutionary intellectuals, (4) the colonial 
administrators, and (5) the nationalist leaders. 
The colonial administrators have created, in many countries of Asia and Africa, some of the 
prerequisites for industrial development, by establishing an effective administration and 
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judiciary, introducing modern education and promoting modern systems of banking and 
commerce, as well as some modern industries. In spite of all this assistance, the countries 
under foreign domination are unable to achieve a fast industralization, mainly because of the 
economic interests of the colonial power. 
The dynastic elite has a limited role since it is concerned with preserving their social status. 
Such a status makes this kind of elite legitimate and provides it with social force; yet, at the 
same time, it makes it inoperant. 
The roots of the new colonial elites in the countries under foreign domination may be 
found in two subgroups: On the one hand, the national leaders who seek to achieve political 
independence, and on the other hand, the revolutionary intellectuals. 
These ideal kinds of elites act in similar ways in the third-world countries; the cultural gap 
between the elite and the masses in these countries is remarkably wider than in the 
developed countries. One of the main sources for this cultural and social polarization lied in 
the existing relationship between the third-world elites and the West. The constant exchange 
of input, the Western influence and the exportation of ideology to the East are some of the 
pillars of these relationship based on mutual necessity and even almost dependence. 
This relationship, which in this case has been extremely direct, provides the Palestinian 
elite of Jerusalem with a kind of self-legitimacy that transforms it in the rulers of the destiny 
of a stateless people. 
 
The Palestinian Elite before 1948 
Jerusalem, the Holy Land 
“Glory be to him who made His servant go by night from the sacred mosque whose 
surroundings We have blessed, that We might show him some of our signs”... (The Koran, 17.1) 
This quotation from the Koran makes clear the importance of Jerusalem as a holy city for 
the Muslim world. 
At the beginning of the Muslim era, prophet Muhammad chooses Jerusalem as the site to 
which all the Muslims have to address their prayers. Still, when he realizes that the Jews from 
Hejaz will not adopt the new religion as their own, Muhammad established that Mecca is the 
new place to which prayers must be oriented. 
Despite this change, Jerusalem preserves its sacred character: First of all, it is the third 
sacred city for the Muslim world; secondly, the al-Aqsa mosque is erected in this city in the 
exact place from which, according to the Muslim religion, the prophet has ascended to heaven. 
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Thanks to its sacred status, Jerusalem provides its inhabitants with power and a status that, 
had they lived in other Palestinian cities, they would not have enjoyed. To this, we should also 
add the growing international importance of the city in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
During the Ottoman period, Jerusalem is a mere district subordinated to Istambul, and the 
Mufti of Jerusalem is, by the same token, subordinated to the Sheik ul-Islam at the Ottoman 
capital. Because of this, the desintegration of the Ottoman empire and the centralization of 
Jerusalem during the Mandate endows Jerusalem with an unprecedented importance. Is it on 
account of the new status of Jerusalem as capital of the Mandate that it has become so 
powerful? Or maybe, is it the traditional families that, in time and through several public 
policies, have further fostered the belief in a sacred Jerusalem. 
As for Palestine, it acquires its status as the Holy Land for the Muslims after Salah al-Din 
reconquers the city in 1187, which has previously been in the hands of the Crusaders. 
Therefore, the city of Jerusalem manages to create a magic, a mysticism and a power that 
encourages us to focus our analysis on the Nashashibi and Husayni families. 
 
The Important Families 
Within the Palestinian social structure, the dominant families set the social, political, 
religious and economic pace. They are in contact with the governing power and with the West, 
and its members hold important offices at social and political levels owing to their western 
education. These families are the custodians of the Holy Places, legitimate the governing 
power and, in consequence, are able to take advantage of their position as middlemen. 
In this subworld, there are some families whose power decline, while some others become 
more influencial. Some of them are guided by a head of family in charge of guiding the clan, 
whereas in other cases, there is a specific individual who monopolizes all the power. All of 
these changes are affected by the internal social pace. In our case, the most influencial factors 
are the penetration of the capitalist system and the Europeanization that has taken place since 
the beginning of this century. 
In every city and village there is a group of important families which varies according to the 
population size of the settlement. If the population is greater in size, there are more dominant 
families, and viceversa. It is important to remark that this equation fails to apply to all the 
cases but is nevertheless the case of an outstanding number of settlements. Still, with the 
advent of modernity, an important number of influential families migrate from the rural areas 
to the cities. 
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Before 1948, there are in Palestine three different kinds of families in the Arab society: The 
great urban families --influential at a national level--, the semi-urban families --only influential 
at a regional level--, and the families inhabiting the villages, who have little influence on their 
milieu. 
It is important to explain the differences existing between the cities and the villages of 
those times, as well as to analyze the social and political role of the villages within the 
Palestinian society. 
Before the creation of the state of Israel, 65% of the Arabs in Palestine have lived in the 
villages, and agricuture has constituted their main occupation. The majority of the falakhim, 
tenant farmers who are settled in the villages, are Muslim Arabs. The Christian Arabs 
represent a small percentage of the villagers. For the most part, they live in the cities. The 
Arab villages are characterized by the following two aspects: Firstly, their lack of space --there 
is no room for streets and the houses are extremely cramped--, and secondly their physical 
location at the mountainsides. Still, the political and economic features of the villages are 
determined their distance with respect to the cities. The villages located near the cities are 
under the economic influence of the cities, and their produce is more easily sold and at better 
prices. The city is also a source of employment for the falakhim. In other words, they have all 
the benefits of living next to the modern world. The land, as a means of production, is the 
principal basis in the lives of the falakhim. There are five different kinds of land, each having 
its own value, and on many occasions these are manipulated as symbols of power by the 
inhabitants of the cities. In the cities where the Arab population reaches 35%, the proportion 
between Moslem and Christian Arabs is inverted. The Christians account for 80% of the urban 
Arab population. The percentage of the Christian Arab population living in the cities is so 
prominent that, out of the seventeen Arab cities in Palestine, four are completely Christian, 
namely: Nazareth, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Beit Ja'la. In Yaffo and Tzfat, Arabs are the 
majority of the population, whereas Jerusalem, Haifa and Tiberiades have a Jewish majority. 
A constant wave of migration to the cities takes place, resulting from the introduction of 
capitalism and the process of urbanization that has begun since the second half of the last 
century. The Christian Arabs have the greater benefits arising from these changes. This 
resettlement in the cities brings about a difficult adaptation of the traditional elite to the new 
patterns of modern education of the Ottoman Empire. It is important to emphasize that the 
important families living in the cities have preserved their ties with the villages, since the 
former are still the owners of farming land, which are for them a source of income. 
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It is impossible to observe any kinds of elites in the rural Arab society. There is no 
difference between the owners of the means of production and the owners of the factories. 
The same applies to the owners of the financial capital and the owners of commercial capital. 
All of these are monopolized by a single individual, a single family: This is a patriarchal 
system. 
The situation is altogether different in the cities. The families are not as powerful as in the 
villages. It is only the social power that remains almost intact, and this is because of the 
conservative character of this society. The prominent families continue to hold important 
public offices, while economic power is more widely spread. The competition within the 
political and economic power is mirrored by the creation of political parties in the Arab 
society. There are few ideological differences between them and, in consequence, it is logical 
to think that these parties are employed as indicators of power. 
This applies to the Nashashibis and Husaynis, who form their own political parties as 
markers of competition and rivalry. (In those days, there are about sixty one thousand Arabs 
living in Jerusalem, and the city has one of the greater Arab populations of British Palestine.) 
The Husaynis have become powerful during the last generations. According to some 
sources, they are mentioned in the Jerusalem chronicles as early as the thirteenth century; in 
contrast, other sources suggest that they have become known since the sixteenth century. At 
the beginning of the seventeenth century, Abd al-Qadir Ibn Karim al-Din al-Wafa'i al-Husayni 
had held the office of Mufti of Jerusalem; by keeping this office, the national status of the 
family is granted. Although this family fails to hold this office for a century and a half, they 
manage to recover it at the beginning of the last century in order to monopolize it. The 
members of this family hold high positions in the Jerusalem district and in the central 
government administration in Istambul. Al-Wafa al-Husayni's sister marries the Iman of the 
al-Aqsa mosque, and their descendants preserve their Sharif lineage and their family name, 
Husayni. 
The ties of this family with the governing power begin to be woven at the different social 
spheres. When the British inaugurate their mandate, they learn that one of the members of 
this family is the mayor of Jerusalem, while the other is the Mufti of that city. 
The Nashashibis have lived in Jerusalem since the fifteenth century. It is believed that this 
family is of Kurdish descent. Still, they become powerful only at the beginning of the present 
century. After Uthman al-Nashashibi is appointed member of the Ottoman Parliament in 1912, 
this family begins to be influential. With Uthman al-Nashashibi's death, the family base their 
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power on Raghib al-Nashashibi's status at the Ottoman Parliament (1914) and on the 
subsequent offices that the latter holds during his career. Since 1914, Raghib al-Nashashibi 
represents Jerusalem at the Ottoman Parliament. 
The rivalry and competition between the two families lie in their respective attempts to 
gain political power over Jerusalem. This enmity is further increased when in 1920 Husayni is 
discharged from office by the British authorities. 
The Nashashibis are ardent opposers to the Supreme Moslem Council, and try by all means 
to resist the policies of this institution, which is managed by the Husaynis and their followers. 
 
The Elites as a Guaranty of Security in the Face of the British Mandate 
When the British formally begin their Mandate over Palestine, they become acquainted 
with an urban elite which has already politicized the public life of the place. During the last 
years of the Ottoman Empire, a number of events take place, and these conclude with the 
politization of the public life. One of these is the institution of parliamentary elections in 1876, 
1908, 1912 and 1914. As a result, the urban elites have a new instrument of power and 
influence that could be employed not only vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire, but also vis-a-vis 
their pairs in the villages. In order to ensure the power of the elites, the elections take place in 
two stages, and only the owners of a substancial amount of capital are entitled to cast a vote. 
Thus, only a select class of people are given the right to vote and, by the way, it is this social 
group that benefits from the results. As Yoshua Porat states in The Emergence of the 
Palestinian-Arab National Movement, “a close corporation of Arab families, not recognized by 
the law, but influential by position, usurped all the municipal offices among them” (p. 14). 
The creation of new associations such as the Arab Club (al-Nadi al-Arabi), and the Literary 
Club (al-Mantada al-Adabi) are the clearest expressions of the elites' monopolization of the 
public life, by laying emphasis on nationalism. There are no great political differences 
between these associations. They are only divided by the rivalry between the Husaynis and 
the Nashashibis. Moreover, these two clubs consider Palestine as the southern part of Syria, 
and seek to accomplish the dream of a Great Syria. al-Nadi al-Arabi is managed by the younger 
generation of the Husaynis, and has al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni as its president. al-Mantada al-
Adabi is managed by the younger Nashashibis. 
In turn, these two families are supported by Great Britain and France, which have emerged 
victorious from the war and have gained control of the Middle East. The British Empire has 
contacts with the Husaynis, whereas the French, who seek to emasculate the British power in 
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the region, trust the Nashashibis. In time, this new confrontation ceases to be a conflict 
between families, and acquires a political character. 
Thanks to their relationship with the British, the old elite has access to higher education 
abroad. The majority of the youth educated during the thirties are related to Husayni's clan, 
and accept Hajj Amin al-Husayni's leadership as the Mufti of Jerusalem. In this way, the 
Husaynis reach a very high level of organization and set for themselves a set of goals at a 
national level. In contrast, the Nashashibis are still in a stage dominated by the familial 
perspective and have little reception among the intellectuals. On the one hand, these 
intellectuals become the speakers of the governing regime, and on the other hand, they learn 
how to defend themselves against the British and Zionist politics such as the Balfour 
Declaration. 
In response to this declaration, the Arab community in Palestine tries to form a political 
front so as not to comply with the British orders such as the creation of a legislative council. 
Nevertheless, the Palestinians themselves are divided, and this leads to a new confrontation 
between the families. The Nashashibis head a reaction against the political and religious 
monopoly of the Husaynis, which becomes materialized in the creation of the Executive 
Committee and the Supreme Muslim Council. The Nashashibis attempt to prevent the 
Husaynis from becoming visible and from becoming the de facto Palestinian representatives 
by trying to secure a place at the Supreme Muslim Council (an Arab organization representing 
the community at the Mandate) for themselves. This is achieved in 1926, when the Husaynis 
are defeated. 
In addition, the strife between these families is further aroused in 1920, with the collapse 
of the Southern Syria project. On account of this frustration, Palestinian nationalism 
undergoes a period of crisis that is mirrored by the outbreak of internal conflicts, both at a 
familial and a political level. One of these takes place within the al-Muntada al-Adabi, among 
members of the Nashashibi family and other individuals close to the Husaynis. 
 
How Has a New Elite Come into Existence? 
With the conclusion of the First World War, all the area that has previously belonged to the 
Ottoman Empire comes into possession of the victorious powers, Great Britain and France, 
which divide the region between the two of them. 
In accordance with the Treaty of San Remo (April 25, 1920), Palestine and Jordan are 
assigned to Great Britain, to be governed according to the Mandatorial regime. As the British 
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have been assisted by the Husaynis against the Ottomans, they transfer land to one of Hussein 
ibn Ali's son and appoint him as Emir. In this way, the Hashemite family comes into 
possession of another enclave in the Middle East. This essay does not provide a detailed 
analysis of the quarrels and military and political interests that lead to the creation of 
Transjordan since these fall beyond the scope of this paper. Still, it is important to highlight 
that the existence and survival of Transjordan is conditioned by British interests and needs: 
...”a line [is] drawn from a point two miles west of the town of Aqaba in the gulf of Aqaba up 
the center of Wadi Araba. The Dead Sea and the river Jordan to the junction of the latter with 
the river Yarmuk, thence up the center of the river Yarmuk to the Syrian frontier”... 
(Jerusalem, Palestine Official Gazette, September 1, 1922). These are the frontiers of the new 
Emirate of Transjordan during 1921 and 1948, which has a surface of 35,000 sq. mi. The new 
emir is Abdullah bin-Hussein of the Hashemite dynasty and the thirty eighth generation from 
the Prophet. 
Until the annexation of the West Bank, the economy of the country has been based on a 
fairly primitive agriculture and on stock-breeding. In addition, the country has strongly 
depended on the British economy. One of the king's important goals is to increase the internal 
resources of the country and diversify its external sources of support in order to avoid 
domination. Still, the slow economic development of the country is for the most part due to 
poor regional communication. 
During 1921 and 1948, Abdullah seeks to strengthen his position in Transjordan. In order 
to achieve this, the king enacts a constitution and establishes a parliament, an administrative 
machinery and an efficient army. Nevertheless, after 1948, king Abdullah remains financially, 
militarily and politically dependent on 
Great Britain. 
 
Jordan and the West Bank: A Complementary Need 
After the British withdrawal from Palestine, Abdullah is given free rein to expand his 
dominions. Thanks to the annexation of the West Bank, Transjordan now has a new raison 
d'etre and a new regional balance that allows the country to face the coming years. 
King Abdullah's tutelage of the Husaynis and the Nashashibis is a fact that benefits both 
groups and the king himself. On the one hand, the Palestinians need a formal framework that 
protects them; on the other hand, the Transjordans look upon the Palestinian population as a 
source for their development and growth as a state. The king considers the annexation as the 
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fulfilment of his own territorial ambitions. Still, Abdullah finds some obstacles on his way to a 
total internal recognition, such as the refusal of Hajj Amin al-Husayni (the Mufi of Jerusalem), 
and the communit parties between 1949-1951, to acknowledge the king's legitimacy. 
Below is a brief explanation is provided on the main axes of this annexation: The first 
measure is taken in December 1948, when a conference is held in Jericho in which the 
Palestinian dignataries ask Abdullah to be king of the Palestinians. The former believe in the 
possibility of a Palestinian union and, for the first time, the issue of the Palestinian refugees is 
addressed. The second step, and almost final, is the Amistice Agreement on April 1949 
between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan; after a ceasefire in the region, this agreement 
takes for granted annexation of the West Bank by the Transjordans. 
Once the annexation becomes an accomplished fact, the principle of equal rights begins to 
be applied: In May 1949, for the first time Palestinians are appointed as ministers of the 
Transjordan government. The new three ministers are Ruhi Abdul (foreign affairs), Musa 
Nasir (communications) and Khulusi al-Khairi (agriculture and customs). 
As one of the last and most important measures, the name of the country is changed, so that 
it may include all of its inhabitants. In June 1949, the country adopts “The Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan” as its name; in this way, no emphasis is laid on neither of the two bands. 
In April 1950, the Palestinians participate in the Jordanian elections for the first time, and 
eventually the Jordan parliament enacts the formal annexation of the West Bank. In this way, 
the last details of the annexation are formalized. 
A new royal decree on December 2, 1950, creates a new office: Custodian of the Holy 
Places. Thus, Raghib al-Nashashibi, the appointed official, is responsible for preserving the 
harmony among the different religious communities. In this way, the Nashashibis begin to 
occupy offices in the new kingdom. 
The new annexion brings about a great deal of changes at the social, political and economic 
level. The most important of them is the population increase resulting from the annexation. 
Before 1948, the Transjordan population has reached 400,000 inhabitants. With the 
annexation of the West Bank, the population increases in 900,000 inhabitants of Palestinian 
origin. The population of the kingdom doubles in a matter of months. The majority of these 
Palestinians live in the West Bank. 38% of the refugees live in the cities, whereas 30% of them 
live in refugee camps. 
The second change is marked by the difference existing between the two groups at a 
cultural level. The high percentages greatly favour, at an educational level, the new 
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inhabitants. There are also remarkable differences at a political level. The Transjordans' little 
experience at the political arena fails to resemble the Palestinians'. The latter's fights against 
the Zionists and the interests of the British mandate have provided them with an outstanding 
political training. By accepting these differences, the Jordan government is forced to 
restructure the administrative and political organization of the West Bank in order to impose 
his own authority. The creation of integrative institutions is a means of imposing the king's 
authority or of integrating the two groups. Nonetheless, in spite of all this equality, the 
Hashemite regime prevents the Palestinians from growing too powerful by becoming a 
majority in key places such as the Senate, the House of Representatives and the Cabinet. The 
king is also extremely selective in his political and military appointments. Amman tries to 
choose people who are close and loyal to the royal court, and who share the same goals. The 
majority of these appointments involve the Nashashibis and their disciples. The Nashashibi 
wing figures prominently in appointments to the Senate in the first year after the annexation. 
Out of eight senatorial appointments, five of them belong to the Nashashibis. A civil 
administration is established in all the districts, and by royal decree, on March 6 1949, three 
governors are appointed. It is important to remark that Raghib al-Nashashibi is appointed as 
the new governor of Jerusalem. 
On the other hand, the Husaynis consider king Abdullah as a traitor to the Arab cause, and 
they accuse him of reaching agreements with the Zionists and the Western powers. Distrustful 
of king Abdullah's intentions toward the Palestinians, the Husaynis try to create a new 
separate entity, which they call the All-Palestine government. 
The need to assist the refugees is one of the problems of the kingdom. To that aim, the 
Ministry for Refugee Affairs and Rehabilitation is created by royal decree in August 1949. Its 
aim is to increase the assistance given to the refugees and its new minister is the governor of 
Jerusalem, Raghib al-Nashashibi. 
As Shaul Mishal states in West Bank and East Bank, after 1948 there are two states in with 
three different societies. These societies have opposite interests that will eventually erupt 
from the deepest foundations of society. There are imminent divisions at every level. 
 
Political Parties as a New Elite? 
The outcome of the annexation leaves the Palestinians unsatisfied. They disagree with the 
country's foreign and domestic affairs, in which they find traits of ethnical bias. In addition, 
they strongly question parliamentary ethics. In this way, they begin to protest against the 
III Jornadas de Medio Oriente | Departamento de Medio Oriente 
Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales | Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales (UNLP) | 2000 
 
15 
 
government, and one of the best ways to do so, according to them, is through the creation of 
political parties. 
The political parties emerge in Jordan at the begining of the 1950's. The ruling foreign 
power, Great Britain, is totally against their existance, even when the Arab world negatively 
perceives this reaction. Several of these parties have an anti-Hashemite stance, for they 
consider the regime as an ally of the western powers, especially Great Britain. In consequence, 
all the Jordanian political parties belong to the opposition. The ideals of the parties have 
constantly swung between international Marxism and Arab nationalism. Eventually, this force 
both parties to review and change their policies and stance towards the regime. Since the 
middle of 1951, the communist parties have to resign themselves to the yoke of power. The 
clearest proof of this is that the party decides to substitute its name: League of National 
Liberation instead of Jordan Communist Party. 
There are two reasons that have triggered the formation of political parties: 
a) The enactment of the Jordanian constitution 
b) The new situation of the country after the annexation of the West Bank in 1950 
Nonetheless, in spite of all this freedom, the government has the prerogative, by law, to 
dissolve any political party that is against governmental regulations, that presents false 
details of their true goals or that is subsidized by external sources. In other words, it is 
possible to dissolve any party that opposes governmental policies. 
Amnon Cohen defines the political parties as “the articulate organization of society's active 
political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who 
compete for popular support with another group or group holding divergent views”. (p. 20) 
The Jordanian parliamentary structure fails to be highly representative, since a large 
number of the population has low educational levels. The number of Jordanians who become 
members of political parties has never been high. 
The socially more radical parties have copied the model of the communist parties in the 
world, such as The Communist, the Qawmiyun and the Baath. The most conservative right-
wing parties have a totally different structure. 
The political platforms of all the Jordanian political parties lay emphasis on social change. 
Their main preoccupation is to find a solution for all the political pressures from which Jordan 
suffers. The majority of the political parties have a branch in the Hashemite kingdom, but 
their seat is abroad. 
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After the annexation, all the Jordanian political parties consider the Palestinians as a source 
of strength to fight against the system. They are willing to please the new population in order 
to obtain their support, some times at the expense of their own ideals. The time will prove 
that to invest on the Palestinian population from the West Bank has been the wisest decision 
of the Jordanian parties: In that piece of land, the majority of the work and political movement 
is concentrated. 
 
Conclusion 
In every society, as Pareto states, there are individuals who govern and individuals who are 
governed. The elite in Jerusalem has been able to preserve its power as such, in spite of the 
different events that they have experienced. 
It is true that the creation of the State of Israel modifies the political map of the Middle East, 
and indirectly affects the relationship between the elites and the government. Nevertheless, 
before and after 1948, the political situation in the region has been highly unpredictable, and 
the different kinds of nationalisms have tried to achieve their own aims of creating a state. 
The rivalry between the Husaynis and the Nashashibis during the years of the mandate takes 
place at different public spheres. The relationship between the elites and the foreign powers, 
the centralization of Jerusalem as the heart of the British mandate and the divergent internal 
policies set the pace for these families. The Husaynis have a great experience in matters of 
power, since they have had it for decades. In contrast, the Nashashibis are new in the political 
arena. Nevertheless, both families have the same goal in common: power for its own sake. 
But are these families accepted by the people? It may be stated that they are: The people at 
that time have not had any influence at all, so it is very difficult for the latter to make these 
families legitimate. Still, are these families accepted by the government or do they seek to be 
accepted by it? The British have to apply the Mandate and benefit from it. For this reason, they 
need to be in constant communication with the Palestinian elite. This closeness is achieved by 
sealing pacts with the elites and by trying to penetrate this subworld in order to learn its 
values. It is important for the mandatorial authorities to become more fully acquainted with a 
Middle East that is still pervaded with legends that even Napoleon Bonaparte has been unable 
to eradicate. 
The creation of political parties during the thirties constitute a form of political 
confrontation. On the one hand, the Husaynis create the Arab Palestinian Party (al-Hizb al-
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Arabi al-Filistini); on the other hand, the Nashashibis form the National Defence Party (al-Hizb 
al-Difa al-Watani). 
After the annexation, these two families take completely different paths: On the one hand, 
the Nashashibis find an ally in the future king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, whose 
main confidant is Raghib al-Nashashibi. King Abdullah himself tries to obtain the support of 
some of the most prominent Palestinian families. The monarch is in contact with these 
families and offers them several offices in the country. As it has been stated, Raghib al-
Nashashibi is the head of this family for two periods. During the Jordan period, he has held 
strategic offices: After the annexation, he is appointed as the govenor of Jerusalem, Custodian 
of the Holy Places and Minister for Refugee Affairs and Rehabilitation. All the offices held by 
Raghib al-Nashashibi make him powerful and influential. This family is loyal to the kingdom, 
and most of its members are assigned offices in it. In all of the fifteen cabinets formed 
between 1950 and 1956 there have always been Palestinians. The majority of them support 
the government and the Nashashibis. Somehow, they mark 
the Palestinian hegemony in Jordanian politics for the first years, above all in ministeries 
such as the Ministery of Foreign Affairs and several Jordanian embassies abroad. This 
hegemony is closely monitored by the king, who would not have allowed a complete 
Palestinian hegemony. 
In contrast, the Husaynis have a different stance. After the partition and eventual 
annexation of the West Bank, this family tries to form their own state. Do they consider 
themselves powerful enough to accomplish that aim? Perhaps they think that that is the only 
way of preserving their power. 
With the creation of the All Palestinian Government in 1948, the Husaynis are once again at 
the center of the conflict. Supported by the Arab League and under the supervision of the Arab 
High Committee, Al Hajj al-Husayni proclaims himself as president of the state. The new state 
is supported by the majority of the Arab countries, but king Abdullah and the western powers 
are opposed to it. 
The Husaynis consider king Abdullah a traitor to the Arab cause, and therefore, all of his 
supporters are similarly perceived. Once again, the Nashashibis are confronted with the 
Husaynis. In response to this declaration, Abdullah calls his supporters and holds a congress 
in Amman in 1948 (two months before the congress held in Jericho) in which the new 
government in Gaza is repudiated and Abdullah is asked to guide and protect the Palestinians. 
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In December 1948, by appointing Shaykh Hasamuddin Jarallah as the new Mufti of 
Jerusalem, king Abdullah openly challenges the Husaynis. As the Husaynis are opposed to the 
king, their power and influence decline. Even though some of the members of this family base 
their claims on lineage or money, a new elite emerges, consisting of professionals, 
intellectuals and the military. This new elite owes nothing to nobody. 
In conclusion, the Palestinian elites have had a fundamental role in the development of the 
Palestinian society. It is true that before 1948 the fight between the families strengthen their 
power within the Palestinian society. The urban life, the modernization and the high 
standards of living legitimate of the elites. The events taking place after 1948 involve the 
Hussaynis' loss of power and the Nashashibis become allies of the Jordan government, thus 
strengthening their status. 
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